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HIERARCHICAL MIXTURE MODELS FOR ASSESSING
FINGERPRINT INDIVIDUALITY1
By Sarat C. Dass and Mingfei Li
Michigan State University and Bentley University
The study of fingerprint individuality aims to determine to what
extent a fingerprint uniquely identifies an individual. Recent court
cases have highlighted the need for measures of fingerprint indi-
viduality when a person is identified based on fingerprint evidence.
The main challenge in studies of fingerprint individuality is to ade-
quately capture the variability of fingerprint features in a population.
In this paper hierarchical mixture models are introduced to infer the
extent of individualization. Hierarchical mixtures utilize complemen-
tary aspects of mixtures at different levels of the hierarchy. At the
first (top) level, a mixture is used to represent homogeneous groups
of fingerprints in the population, whereas at the second level, nested
mixtures are used as flexible representations of distributions of fea-
tures from each fingerprint. Inference for hierarchical mixtures is more
challenging since the number of unknown mixture components arise
in both the first and second levels of the hierarchy. A Bayesian ap-
proach based on reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo method-
ology is developed for the inference of all unknown parameters of
hierarchical mixtures. The methodology is illustrated on fingerprint
images from the NIST database and is used to make inference on
fingerprint individuality estimates from this population.
1. Introduction. Recent court cases have highlighted the need for report-
ing error rates when an individual is identified based on forensic evidence
such as fingerprints. In the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
[Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993)], the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that in order for expert forensic testimony to be allowed in
courts, it had to be subject to five main criteria of scientific validation, that
is, whether (i) the particular technique or methodology has been subject to
statistical hypothesis testing, (ii) its error rates have been established, (iii)
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standards controlling the technique’s operation exist and have been main-
tained, (iv) it has been peer reviewed, and (v) it has a general widespread
acceptance [see Pankanti, Prabhakar and Jain (2002) and Zhu, Dass and
Jain (2007)]. Following Daubert, forensic evidence based on fingerprints was
first challenged in the 1999 case of U.S. v. Byron C. Mitchell, stating that
the fundamental premise for asserting the uniqueness of fingerprints had not
been objectively tested and its potential matching error rates were unknown.
Subsequently, fingerprint based identification has been challenged in more
than 20 court cases in the United States. To address these concerns, several
research investigations have proposed measures that characterize the extent
of uniqueness of fingerprints (i.e., fingerprint individuality); see Pankanti,
Prabhakar and Jain (2002), Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) and the references
therein. The primary aim of these measures is to capture the inherent vari-
ability and uncertainty when an individual is identified based on fingerprint
evidence.
The statistical test of hypotheses for fingerprint based identification can
be set up as follows: Consider an input fingerprint with an unknown identity
It being compared to the fingerprint of a claimed identity Ic. The test of
hypotheses is
H0 : It 6= Ic versus H1 : It = Ic,(1.1)
where H0 (resp., H1) is the hypothesis of a negative (resp., positive) identifi-
cation. The hypotheses posed in the order of negative vs. positive identifica-
tion (as opposed to the reverse order) allows us to control for the probability
of making a false positive identification (i.e., the probability of Type I error).
The test of H0 versus H1 in (1.1) is carried out by ascertaining the degree
of similarity between the two prints and involves two important steps: First,
salient fingerprint features are extracted from each print, and second, the
collection of features of the two prints are “matched” with each other to
obtain the best measure of similarity.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of the feature extraction and matching pro-
cedures described in the previous paragraph. Typical fingerprints as in Fig-
ure 1 consist of smooth, nonintersecting flow patterns with alternating dark
and light lines, called ridges and valleys, respectively. Occasionally, a ridge
will either bifurcate or terminate and give rise to an anomaly. The anomalies
in the ridge structures are called minutiae which are the fingerprint features
used for identifying individuals. Figure 1 shows the locations of minutiae
(x ∈ R2) as white squares for the two fingerprint images extracted using
a pattern recognition algorithm described in Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007).
Minutiae information of a fingerprint is easy to extract, permanent (does
not change with time) and unique (distinct minutiae patterns for different
individuals), making it a popular method for identifying individuals in the
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forensics community. Subsequently, the number of matches is determined
by an optimal rigid transformation that brings the two sets of minutiae as
close to each other as possible and counting the number of minutiae in the
right panel that falls within a square of area 4r20 centered at each minutiae
in the left panel; r0 is a small prespecified number relative to the size of the
fingerprint image. A higher number of matches indicates a higher degree of
similarity and favors the rejection of H0 in (1.1).
The number of matching minutiae in Figure 1 is 25 but the question is:
Should H0 be rejected? In that case, what is the uncertainty or error associ-
ated with the decision? This is precisely the issue of fingerprint individuality
since error rates associated with the observed match are unknown. Pankanti,
Prabhakar and Jain (2002) and Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) propose using the
probability of a random correspondence (PRC) as a measure of fingerprint
individuality. Mathematically, the PRC is expressed as
PRC(w|m,n) = P (S ≥w|m,n),(1.2)
where the random variable S denotes the number of minutiae matches, w
denotes the observed number of matches, and m and n, respectively, are the
number of minutiae in the two fingerprint images. The probability in (1.2)
is calculated assuming H0 is true, that is, the pair of prints are impostors
coming from two different individuals. Small (resp., large) values of the PRC
indicate low (resp., high) levels of uncertainty which correspond to high
(resp., low) extent of fingerprint individualization. A PRC of 0.0004, for
example, indicates that only 4 out of 10,000 impostor matches will result in
matching numbers that are greater than or equal to w. So, having observed
w causes us to suspect that H0 may not be true. The uncertainty associated
with this suspicion decreases as the PRC gets smaller (i.e., closer to 0).
Fig. 1. Illustrating minutiae matching [taken from Pankanti, Prabhakar and Jain
(2002)]. A total of m = 64 and n = 65 minutiae were detected in left and right image,
respectively, and 25 correspondences (i.e., matches) were found. The white squares and
lines, respectively, represent the minutiae location and the direction of ridge flow at that
minutiae.
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The connection between the PRC and the hypothesis testing criteria in
Daubert (which is one of the five main criteria for the scientific validation
of forensic evidence) can be seen as follows: Under the hypotheses testing
of (1.1), the PRC is the p-value, computed under H0, corresponding to the
observed number of matches w.
The value of the PRC depends on the distribution of minutiae locations
in a pair of prints. Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) demonstrated that when m
and n are large, the distribution of S in (1.2) can be approximated by a
Poisson distribution with mean (expected) number of matches
λ(q1, q2,m,n) =mnp(q1, q2),(1.3)
where qh, h= 1,2 are the distributions fitted to the minutiae locations in the
pair of prints, and p(q1, q2) is the probability of a match given by
p(q1, q2) =
∫ ∫
(x,y) : x∈S(y,r0)
q1(x)q2(y)dxdy,(1.4)
where x ∈R2 and y ∈R2 are independent minutiae from q1 and q2, respec-
tively, and S(y, r0) is the square of area 4r
2
0 centered at y.
The reliability of the PRC computed from a sample of fingerprints depends
on (1) how well elicited statistical models fit the distribution of minutiae for
different fingerprints, and (2) whether the sample is representative of the
target population. The aim in this paper is to develop methodology for (1)
while implicitly assuming the validity of (2). Thus, the results in Section 5 are
valid for a population which has the fingerprint database as a representative
sample.
It is well known, for example, that the distribution of minutiae locations
in fingerprints tend to form clusters [see, e.g., Scolve (1979), Stoney and
Thornton (1986) and Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007)]. Thus, candidate statistical
models have to meet two important requirements: (i) flexibility, that is,
the model can represent a variety of minutiae distributions for different
fingerprints, and (ii) associated measures of fingerprint individuality can be
easily obtained from these models. These considerations led Zhu, Dass and
Jain (2007) to propose mixture distributions as candidate choices for q1 and
q2. Based on mixtures of independent normals, the analytical expression for
p(q1, q2) in (1.6) becomes
p(q1, q2) = 4r
2
0
K1∑
k=1
K2∑
k′=1
2∏
b=1
φ1(0| (µ
(b)
k1 − µ
(b)
k2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸, (σ(b)k1 )2 + (σ(b)k2 )2︸ ︷︷ ︸),(1.5)
µ σ2
where qh(x) =
∑Kh
k=1
∏2
b=1 φ1(x
(b)|µ
(b)
kh , (σ
(b)
kh )
2) for h = 1,2, x = (x(1), x(2))
and φ1(·|µ,σ
2) is the normal density with mean µ and variance σ2.
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One drawback of Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) is that no statistical model
is elicited on the minutiae for a population of fingerprints; standard mix-
ture distributions were proposed for minutiae distributions in each finger-
print separately. As a result, no inference (e.g., confidence intervals) can
be obtained for the population version of the PRC. This is our motivation
for developing hierarchical mixture models and related inferential tools in
this paper. The hierarchical mixture model [see (2.1)] is a model on the
minutiae for a population of fingerprints that satisfies both requirements
of (i) flexibility and (ii) computational ease mentioned earlier. We assume
that the fingerprint population consists of G homogeneous groups with re-
spect to the distribution of minutiae, with qg and wg, respectively, denoting
the distribution of minutiae locations and population proportion of the gth
sub-population, g = 1,2, . . . ,G. For a fingerprint pair coming from the sub-
populations g1 and g2 with 1≤ g1, g2 ≤G, we have q1 = qg1 and q2 = qg2 in
(1.3). Hence, it follows that the population mean PRC corresponding to w
observed matches in the population is given by
PRC(w|m,n) =
G∑
g1=1
G∑
g2=1
ωg1ωg2P (S ≥w|λ(qg1 , qg2 ,m,n)),(1.6)
where S follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ(qg1 , qg2 ,m,n).
In this paper a Bayesian framework for the inference from hierarchical
mixture models is developed, which in turn can be used to make inference
for the population mean PRC in (1.6). Hierarchical mixture models contain
an unknown number of mixture components at two levels. Green (1995) and
Green and Richardson (1997) developed the reversible jump Markov chain
Monte Carlo (RJMCMC) approach for estimating the unknown number of
mixture components by exploring the space of models of varying dimensions.
The RJMCMC procedure developed in this paper generalizes the work of
Green and Richardson (1997) to hierarchical mixture models with two levels
of hierarchy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 devel-
ops hierarchical mixture models for a heterogeneous population of objects
(the objects are fingerprints in our application). Sections 3 and 4 develop
the Bayesian and RJMCMC framework for inference from hierarchical mix-
ture models. Section 5 discusses the application to fingerprint analysis using
PRCs.
2. Hierarchical mixture models. Consider an object, O, selected at ran-
dom from a heterogenous population, P , with G (unknown) groups. Let X ≡
(x1, x2, x3, . . .) denote the observables on O where xj ≡ (x
(1)
j , x
(2)
j , . . . , x
(d)
j )
′
is a d-variate random vector in Rd. A hierarchical mixture model for the
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distribution of O in the population is
q(x) =
G∑
g=1
ωg
n∏
j=1
qg(xj),(2.1)
where x= (x1, x2, . . . , xn) are the n observations made onO, ωg, g = 1,2, . . . ,G
are the G cluster proportions with ωg > 0 and
∑G
g=1ωg = 1, qg(·) is the mix-
ture density for the gth cluster given by
qg(x) =
Kg∑
k=1
pkgfkg(x|λkg),(2.2)
with fkg denoting a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure on R
d, pkg
denoting the mixing probabilities satisfying: (1) pkg > 0 and (2)
∑Kg
k=1 pkg =
1, and λkg denoting the set of all unknown parameters in fkg. Identifiability
of the hierarchical mixture model of (2.1) with respect to its components is
achieved by imposing the constraints
ω1 < ω2 < · · ·< ωG and λ1g ≺ λ2g ≺ · · · ≺ λKgg(2.3)
for each g = 1,2, . . . ,G, where ≺ is a partial ordering to be defined later.
The set of all unknown parameters in the hierarchical mixture model (2.1) is
denoted by θ = (G,ω,K,p,λ), where ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωG),K= (K1,K2, . . . ,
Kg), p = (pkg, k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg, g = 1,2, . . . ,G) and λ = (λkg, k = 1,2, . . . ,
Kg, g = 1,2, . . . ,G).
Hierarchical mixture models consists of two levels of hierarchy: At the
first (top, or G) level, the mixture is used to represent the groups, whereas
at the second (or Kg) level, nested mixture models (nested within each
g = 1,2, . . . ,G specification) are used as a flexible representation of the dis-
tribution of observables. The unknown number of mixture components, or
mixture complexity, arise at both levels of the hierarchy, and is, therefore,
more challenging to estimate compared to standard mixtures. Estimating
mixture complexity has been the focus of intense research for many years,
resulting in various estimation methodologies in a broad application domain.
Nonparametric methods were developed in Escobar and West (1995) and
Roeder and Wasserman (1997), whereas Ishwaran, James and Sun (2001)
and Woo and Sriram (2007) developed methodology for the robust estima-
tion of mixture complexity for count data. As discussed earlier, our approach
for estimating mixture complexity will be Bayesian based on the RJMCMC
algorithm.
In the subsequent text we assume each fkg is multivariate normal with
mean vector µkg ≡ (µ
(1)
kg , µ
(2)
kg , . . . , µ
(d)
kg )
′ ∈ Rd and covariance matrix
∑
kg ∈
Rd ×Rd.
Our analysis on the fingerprint images in the NIST database (see Section
5) reveal that it is adequate to consider diagonal covariance matrices of the
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form
∑
kg = diag((σ
(1)
kg )
2, (σ
(2)
kg )
2, . . . , (σ
(d)
kg )
2), where (σ
(b)
kg )
2 is the variance
of the bth component. Four different choices of the covariance matrix
∑
kg
are considered, namely, diagonal covariance matrix with (i) common entries
over k [i.e., σ
(d)
kg = σ
(d)
g , for some common value of σ
(d)
g ], (ii) different entries
over k, unrestricted covariance matrix with (iii) common entries over k,
and (iv) different entries over k. These four choices are evaluated using the
Bayes Information Criteria (BIC) which is a model selection criteria that
favors parsimonious models consistent with the observed data. The highest
BIC was found for the choice of diagonal covariance matrix of (i) or (ii) for
almost all of the fingerprints in the NIST database; see Table 1.
Thus, we take the density fkg in (2.2) to be
fkg(x|λkg) = φd(x|µkg,σkg) =
d∏
b=1
φ1(x
(b)|µ
(b)
kg , (σ
(b)
kg )
2),(2.4)
where φ1(·|µ,σ
2) denotes the density of the univariate normal distribution
with mean µ and variance σ2, and σkg ≡ ((σ
(1)
kg )
2, (σ
(2)
kg )
2, . . . , (σ
(d)
kg )
2)′ is the
d-variate vector of the variances. The second identifiability condition of (2.3)
is re-expressed in terms of the first component of the mean vector as
µ
(1)
1g < µ
(1)
2g < · · ·<µ
(1)
Kgg
.(2.5)
For N independent objects selected randomly from the population, it
follows that the distribution of observables for the ith object, i= 1,2, . . . ,N
has the density
q(xi) =
G∑
g=1
ωg
ni∏
j=1
Kg∑
k=1
pkgφd(xij |µkg,σkg),(2.6)
where xi ≡ (xij , j = 1,2, . . . , ni) is the set of ni observations made on the ith
object with each xij ∈R
d, for j = 1,2, . . . , ni. It follows from independence
that the joint distribution of all observables, x ≡ (xi, i = 1,2, . . . ,N), from
N objects is given by
∏N
i=1 q(xi).
Table 1
Covariance matrix selection: Entries give the number and percentages of fingerprint
images in the NIST database that ranked each covariance model as the top choice based
on BIC
Covariance choice (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Total
Frequency 1731 238 0 29 1998
Percentage 86.64 11.91 0 1.45 100.00
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Two other notations are introduced here: µ and σ will respectively denote
the collection of all {µkg, k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg, g = 1,2, . . . ,G} and {σkg, k = 1,2,
. . . ,Kg, g = 1,2, . . . ,G} vectors. Our goal is to infer the unknown parameters
θ = (G,ω,K,p,µ,σ) based on the observed data x.
3. A Bayesian framework for inference. For the subsequent text, some
additional notation is introduced. The symbol I(S) will denote the indica-
tor function of the set S , that is, I(S) = 1 if S is true, and 0, otherwise.
The notation A,B, . . . |C,D, . . . will denote the distribution of random vari-
ables A,B, . . . conditioned on C,D, . . . , with π(A,B, . . . |C,D, . . .) denoting
the specific form of the conditional distribution. Also, π(A,B, . . . |·) will de-
note the distribution of A,B, . . . given the rest of the parameters. We specify
a joint prior distribution on θ in terms of the hierarchical specification
π(θ) = π(G,K) · π(ω,p|G,K) · π(µ|G,K) · π(σ|G,K).(3.1)
The component priors in (3.1) are as follows:
(1) The prior on the mean vector is taken as
π(µ|K,G) =
G∏
g=1
[(
Kg!
Kg∏
k=1
φ1(µ
(1)
kg |µ0, τ
2)
)
× (I(µ
(1)
1g <µ
(1)
2g < · · ·<µ
(1)
Kgg
))(3.2)
×
(
d∏
b=2
Kg∏
k=1
φ1(µ
(b)
kg |µ0, τ
2)
)]
.
The indicator function appears due to the identifiability constraint (2.3) im-
posed on µ with resulting normalizing constant Kg! for each g = 1,2, . . . ,G.
(2) The prior distribution of the variances is taken as
π(σ|K,G) =
G∏
g=1
(
Kg∏
k=1
d∏
b=1
IG((σ
(b)
kg )
2|α0, β0)
)
,(3.3)
where IG denotes the inverse gamma distribution with prior shape and scale
parameters α0 and β0, respectively.
(3) The prior on the first and second level mixing proportions is taken
as
π(ω,p|G,K) =G!DG(ω|δω) · I(ω1 < ω2 < · · ·< ωG)
(3.4)
×
G∏
g=1
DKg(pg|δp),
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where DH(·|δ) denotes the H-dimensional Dirichlet density with the H-
component baseline measure (δ, δ, . . . , δ), where δ is a prespecified constant,
and pg ≡ (p1g, p2g, . . . , pKg,g)
′. The indicator function arises due to the im-
posed identifiability constraint (2.3) on ω. It follows that G! is the appropri-
ate normalizing constant for this constrained density, obtained by integrating
out ω and noting that DG(ω|δω) is invariant under different permutations
of ω.
(4) The prior on G and K is taken as
π(G,K) = π(G) · π(K|G) = π0(G) ·
G∏
g=1
π0(Kg),(3.5)
where π0 is the discrete uniform distribution between Gmin and Gmax (resp.,
Kmin to Kmax), both inclusive, for G (resp., Kg).
The prior on θ depends on the hyper-parameters δp, δω, Gmax, Gmin,
Kmin, Kmax, µ0, τ
2, α0 and β0, all of which need to be specified for a
given application. The reader is referred to our technical report [Dass and
Li (2008)] for these specifications.
The likelihood of the hierarchical mixture model involves several sum-
mations within each product term and is simplified by augmenting vari-
ables to denote the class labels of the individual observations. Two different
class labels are introduced for the two levels of hierarchy: (1) The aug-
mented variable W ≡ (W1,W2, . . . ,WN ) denotes the class label of the G
sub-populations, that is, Wi = g whenever object i arises from the gth sub-
population, and (2) Z ≡ (Z1,Z2, . . . ,ZN ) with Zi ≡ (Zij , j = 1,2, . . . , ni),
where Zij = k for 1 ≤ k ≤ Kg if xij arises from the kth mixture compo-
nent φd(·|µkg,σkg). We denote the augmented parameter space by the same
symbol θ as before, that is, θ = (G,ω,K,p,µ,σ,W,Z). The augmented
likelihood is now
ℓ(G,ω,K,p,µ,σ,W,Z)
(3.6)
=
N∏
i=1
ni∏
j=1
G∏
g=1
Kg∏
k=1
(φd(xij |µkg,σkg))
I(Zij=k,Wi=g),
with priors on W and Z given by
π(W,Z|G,K,ω,p) = π(W|G,ω) · π(Z|G,K,W,p),(3.7)
where π(W|G,ω) =
∏N
i=1
∏G
g=1ω
I(Wi=g)
g and
π(Z|G,K,W,p) =
G∏
g=1
∏
i :Wi=g
ni∏
j=1
Kg∏
k=1
p
I(Zij=k)
kg .
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Based on the augmented likelihood and prior distributions, one can write
down the posterior distribution (up to a normalizing constant) via Bayes
theorem. The posterior has the expression
π(θ|x)∝ ℓ(G,ω,K,p,µ,σ,W,Z)× π(W,Z|G,K,ω,p)
(3.8)
× π(G,K,ω,p,µ,σ)
based on (3.1), (3.6), (3.7) and observed data x.
4. Posterior inference. The total number of unknown parameters in the
hierarchical mixture model depends on the values G and K. Thus, the pos-
terior in (3.8) can be viewed as a probability distribution on the space of all
hierarchical mixture models with varying dimensions. To obtain posterior
inference for such a space of models, Green (1995) and Green and Richard-
son (1997) developed the RJMCMC for Bayesian inference. In this paper we
develop a RJMCMC approach to explore the posterior distribution in (3.8)
resulting from the hierarchical mixture model specification. We briefly dis-
cuss the general RJMCMC implementation here. Let θ and θ∗ be elements
of the model space with possibly differing dimensions. The RJMCMC ap-
proach proposes a move, say, m, with probability rm. The move m takes θ
to θ∗ via the proposal distribution qm(θ,θ
∗). In order to maintain the time
reversibility condition, we require to accept the proposal with probability
α(θ,θ∗) =min
{
1,
π(θ∗|x)
π(θ|x)
rm′qm′(θ
∗,θ)
rmqm(θ,θ
∗)
}
;(4.1)
in (4.1), qm′(θ
∗,θ) represents the probability of moving from θ∗ to θ based
on the “reverse” move m′, and π(θ|x) denotes the posterior distribution of
θ given x. It is crucial that the moves m and m′ be reversible [see Green
(1995)], meaning that the densities qm(θ,θ
∗) and qm′(θ
∗,θ) have the same
support with respect to a dominating measure. In case θ∗ represents the
higher dimensional model, we can first sample u from a proposal q0(θ,u)
(with possible dependence on θ), and then obtain θ∗ as a one-to-one function
of (θ,u). In that case, the proposal density qm(θ,θ
∗) in (4.1) is expressed
as
qm(θ,θ
∗) = q0(θ,u)/det
[
∂θ∗
∂(θ,u)
]
,(4.2)
where ∂θ
∗
∂(θ,u) denotes the Jacobian of the transformation from (θ,u) to
θ∗, and det represents the absolute value of its determinant. If the triplet
(θ,u,θ∗) involves some discrete components, then the Jacobian of the trans-
formation is obtained by the one-to-one map of the continuous parts of θ∗
and (θ,u), which can depend on the values realized by the discrete compo-
nents.
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Fig. 2. Two fingerprint images from the NIST database with minutiae locations indicated
by white squares.
For the inference on hierarchical mixture models, five types of updating
steps are considered with reversible pairs of moves, (m,m′), corresponding
to moves in spaces of varying dimensions. The outline of the steps are as
follows:

(1) Update G with (m,m′)≡ (G-split,G-merge),
(2) Update K|G,ω,W with (m,m′)≡ (K-split,K-merge),
(3) Update ω|G,K,W,Z,p,µ,σ,
(4) Update W,Z|G,K,ω,p,µ,σ and
(5) Update p,µ,σ|G,K,ω,W,Z.
(4.3)
Our methodological contribution is the development of the Update G
steps (G-split and G-merge) based on a pair of reversible jump moves.
The steps for merging and splittingG are described in detail in the Appendix.
The Update K steps are similar to that of Green and Richardson (1997).
The other steps (3)–(5) do not involve jumps in spaces of varying dimen-
sions, and can be carried out based on a regular Gibbs proposal. One cycle
through steps (1)–(5) completes one iteration of the RJMCMC sampler.
The assessment of convergence of the RJMCMC is carried out based on
the methodology of Brooks and Guidici (1998, 2000). A total of 3 chains are
run from different starting points and different variance components of the
log-likelihood are calculated to obtain 3 diagnostic plots, namely, the plots
of (i) the overall and within chain variance, Vˆ and Wc, (ii) within model
and within chain within model variances, Wm and WmWc, and (iii) between
model and between model within chain variances, Bm and BmWc, against
the number of iterations. The merging of the two lines in each plot indicate
that the chains have sufficiently mixed.
5. Assessing fingerprint individuality. Our inferential methodology for
assessing fingerprint individuality is illustrated using fingerprint images from
the NIST Special Database. The NIST fingerprint database is publicly avail-
able and consists of 2000 8-bit gray scale fingerprint image pairs of size 512-
by-512 pixels. Because of the similarity of the image pairs, only the first
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image of each pair was used in the statistical modeling. The algorithm de-
scribed in Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) (also mentioned in the Introduction)
was used to extract minutiae from these images; minutiae could not be au-
tomatically extracted from two images of the NIST database due to poor
quality and these were discarded from further consideration. Figure 2 shows
examples of two fingerprint images from the NIST database with minutiae
locations indicated by white squares.
The RJMCMC algorithm developed in the previous section is used to
obtain the posterior distribution of PRC. The first N0 = 100 fingerprint im-
ages from the NIST database are taken as the sample and three chains with
starting values obtained using the clustering procedure of Zhu, Dass and
Jain (2007) are run. Figure 3 gives the diagnostic plots of the RJMCMC
sampler which establish convergence after a burn-in of B = 250,000 itera-
tions. The posterior distribution of PRC (corresponding to m= 64, n= 65,
w = 25 and r0 = 15 pixels) based on 1000 realizations of the RJMCMC af-
ter the burn-in period is given in Figure 4 with a posterior mean of 0.6859
and the 95% HPD interval given by [0.63,0.735]. We conclude that if a fin-
gerprint pair was chosen from this population with m= 64, n= 65 and an
observed number of matches w = 25, there is high uncertainty in making a
positive identification. Our analysis actually indicates that the fingerprints
in Figure 1 represent a typical impostor pair. The 95% HPD set suggests
that the PRC can be as high as 0.735, that is, about 3 in every 4 impostor
pairs result in 25 or more matches.
How many matches does it take to positively identify an individual? Dif-
ferent countries around the world have different standards [Girard (2007)].
In the Netherlands, this number is 12, whereas in South Africa, it is 7. In
the United States and the UK, this number is not fixed and depends on
expert testimonial. To assess the level of uncertainty associated with these
standards, we conduct a study of the PRC based on w= 7 matches. The best
Fig. 3. Convergence diagnostics for the NIST fingerprint database with N0 = 100. Panels
(a), (b) and (c), respectively, show the plots of (Vˆ ,Wc), (Wm,WmWc) and (Bm,BmWc)
as a function of the iterations. The x-axis unit is 10,000 iterations.
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Fig. 4. Posterior distribution of PRC based on 1000 realizations of the RJMCMC after
300,000 iterations for N0 = 100.
case scenario corresponds to the combination (m,n,w) = (7,7,7) (when all
query and template minutiae match with each other) with a mean PRC of
5.09× 10−5 in Table 2. Note that 7 matches has moderate strength of evi-
dence for declaring a positive match; the PRC implies 5 in 100,000 impostor
fingerprint pairs will have all 7 minutiae match with each other. It is also
very unlikely that n = 7 in real life since fingerprints lifted from a crime
scene have far lesser number of minutiae (thus, m≪ n) compared to the
template it is being matched to. In this latter case, the PRCs are far larger
(see Table 2), making the case for positive identification even weaker.
To compare the results of inference using a larger sample size, we ran the
RJMCMC sampler for the first N0 = 200 and 500 fingerprint images in the
NIST database. The computational complexity increases in two ways: first,
it takes longer, on the average, to complete one iteration of the RJMCMC
and second, the RJMCMC takes a longer time to converge. On our personal
computer with processing speed 2.66 GHz and 1.96 GB of RAM, it took
about 12.5, 31.8 and 90.0 hours, respectively, to generate every 50,000 it-
erations of the RJMCMC for N0 = 100,200 and 500. While the RJMCMC
converged at 300,000 iterations for N0 = 100, the chain did not converge
even at B = 350,000 iterations for N0 = 200 (see Figure 5) and N0 = 500
(the diagnostic plots are not shown).
Discussion: The RJMCMC sampler is able to accommodate all N0 = 1998
fingerprint images from the NIST database. However, this chain is extremely
slow at mixing, and therefore, we do not expect convergence to occur in real
time on our computers. Computational demand magnifies exponentially for
very large databases such as the US-VISIT program. Thus, for implemen-
Table 2
Mean PRCs for the combinations (7,7, n)
n 7 10 15 55 65 75
Mean PRC 5.09× 10−5 1.40× 10−4 3.25× 10−4 0.0155 0.0333 0.0614
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Fig. 5. Convergence diagnostics for the NIST fingerprint database with N0 = 200. Panels
(a), (b) and (c), respectively, show the plots of (Vˆ ,Wc), (Wm,WmWc) and (Bm,BmWc)
as a function of the iterations. The x-axis unit is 10,000 iterations.
tation on very large databases, results can be obtained with the help of
high-end computing facilities.
One enormous advantage of the methodology outlined in this paper is
that the RJMCMC needs to be run on large databases only once. After
convergence is achieved, inference on PRC for any combination of (w,m,n)
can be obtained using formula (1.6). As an illustration based on our smaller
sample size of N0 = 100, Table 3 gives the results of this analysis for different
combinations of (w,m,n). The entries of Table 3 provides a general guide-
line to FBI and forensic experts on the extent of uncertainty associated with
making a positive identification. Note that when (w,m,n) = (25,64,65), the
PRC is high, indicating a low extent of individualization. However, Table
3 also provides several combinations of (w,m,n) that favor positive identi-
fication with a high degree of individualization. For example, we can look
at entries in Table 3 for 95% HPD sets that fall entirely below a threshold,
say, T0. With the choice of T0 = 0.003 (that is, 3 in every 1000 impostor
fingerprint pairs will have w or more observed matches), the combinations
that allow for positive identification with uncertainty level of at most T0
are (45,54,55), (50,54,55), (53,54,55), (50,64,65) and (53,64,65); for these
combinations, the probability that the true PRCs occur below T0 is at least
95%. For larger values of N0, the size of the HPD sets will decrease due to
decreasing variability of the estimate of PRC.
In this paper we only considered a two level hierarchical mixture model.
The US-VISIT program now requires individuals to submit prints from all
10 fingers. This is the case of a 3-level hierarchical mixture model; in the first
(top) level, individuals form the G groups based on similar characteristics
of their 10 fingers, and the distribution of features in each finger is mod-
eled using standard mixtures. Any higher level hierarchical mixture models
will be more involved in two ways: (1) The computational costs, including
memory and time, since convergence will be much slower to achieve, and
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Table 3
Posterior means and 95% HPD sets calculated based on 1000 realizations
of the RJMCMC for N0 = 100
w Mean HPD
(m,n) = (54,55)
25 1.33× 10−1 (1.16,1.53)× 10−1
35 1.70× 10−3 (0.80,3.40)× 10−3
45 5.69× 10−4 (0.0007,2.40) × 10−3
50 5.68× 10−4 (0.00002,2.40) × 10−3
53 5.68× 10−4 (0.0002,7.34) × 10−4
(m,n) = (64,65)
25 6.84× 10−1 (6.27,7.26)× 10−1
35 9.22× 10−2 (0.77,1.09)× 10−1
45 1.90× 10−3 (0.93,3.60)× 10−3
50 6.42× 10−4 (0.0051,2.40) × 10−3
53 5.80× 10−4 (0.0089,2.40) × 10−3
(m,n) = (74,75)
25 9.50× 10−1 (8.99,9.87)× 10−1
35 6.10× 10−1 (5.54,6.57)× 10−1
45 9.91× 10−2 (0.81,1.20)× 10−1
50 2.12× 10−2 (1.63,2.73)× 10−2
53 7.10× 10−3 (5.10,9.80)× 10−3
(2) the development of reversible moves such as G-merge and G-split for
the higher level of mixtures. We are of the view that the best estimate of
the population PRC can be obtained if the data is characterized by a model
that best represents the way the data is structured and observed. In the case
of the US-VISIT, the 3-level hierarchical mixture model is indeed the right
way to view the available data. Further research will be needed to see how
the computational complexity can be reduced. The availability of high-end
computing facilities will definitely be a requirement for fitting higher level
hierarchical mixtures.
The central issue for extending the proposed analysis to other biometrics,
such as face and iris, is the type of feature extracted for each of the differ-
ent biometrics. The framework of hierarchical mixture models will apply to
these biometric traits but we have to develop mixture models on different
feature spaces. The features we used in this paper were minutiae locations,
and therefore, we needed mixture models on points in R2. An additional
feature for fingerprints are the minutiae directions (the white lines in Figure
1). In order to run a similar analysis, one would need to develop suitable
mixture models on the product space R2 × [0,2π). Similarly, in the case
of iris, the feature used is the IrisCode (consisting of a rectangular array
of 0s and 1s), and so the statistical models that have to be developed are
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potentially Markov Random Field models (since there is significant spatial
dependence between neighboring 0s and 1s) indexed by a set of parameters.
Then, one could postulate that the population consists of G such groups of
MRF models. We will also need a distribution for the number of matching
features and derive the distribution of this under impostor pairs of IrisCodes.
6. Summary and future work. We have developed Bayesian inference
methodology for hierarchical mixture models with application to finger-
print individuality. One way to further reduce the level of uncertainty for
a fixed combination (w,m,n) is to increase the number of features used for
matching. Our future work will be to derive hierarchical mixture models on
the extended feature space consisting of minutiae locations and directions.
The challenge here is that the angles are significantly spatially correlated and
the minutiae locations exhibit clusters. We are currently developing a model
that can account for these minutiae characteristics. We plan to improve our
algorithm so that it can be run more quickly on very large databases. Hier-
archical mixture models have potential use in other areas as well, including
the clustering of soil samples (objects) based on soil characteristics which
can be modeled by a mixture or a transformation of mixtures.
APPENDIX
In the subsequent text, the identifiability condition (2.5) based on the
first components of µkg for k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg will be rewritten using the ‘≺’
symbol as
µ1g ≺ µ2g ≺ · · · ≺ µKgg(A.1)
for each g = 1,2, . . . ,G. Let θ and θ∗ denote two different states of the model
space, that is,
θ = (G,ω,K,p,µ,σ,W,Z) and
(A.2)
θ∗ = (G∗,ω∗,K∗,p∗,µ∗,σ∗,W∗,Z∗),
where the ∗s in (A.2) denote a possibly different setting of the parameters.
A.1. The G-merge move. The G-merge move changes the current G to
G− 1 (that is, G∗ =G− 1) and is carried out based on the following steps:
Step 1: Two of the G components, say, g1 and g2, with g1 < g2, are se-
lected randomly for merging into g∗ with ωg∗ = ωg1 + ωg2 .
Step 2: The K-components, Kg1 and Kg2 , are combined to obtain Kg∗ in
the following way. Adding Kg1 +Kg2 =Kt, we set Kg∗ = (Kt+1)/2 if Kt is
odd, and Kg∗ =Kt/2 if Kt is even.
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Step 3: Next, (pg1 ,µg1 ,σg1) and (pg2 ,µg2 ,σg2) are merged to obtain (pg∗ ,
µg∗ ,σg∗) as follows. The identifiability conditions of (A.1) hold for g = g1
and g = g2, and must be ensured to hold for g = g
∗ after the merge step. To
achieve this, the Kt µ’s are arranged in increasing order
µ1 ≺ µ2 ≺ · · · ≺ µKt−1 ≺µKt(A.3)
with associated probability pj for µj , for j = 1,2, . . . ,Kt. Thus, pj are a
re-arrangement of the Kt probabilities in pg1 and pg2 according to the par-
tial ordering on µg1 and µg2 in (A.3). First, the case when Kt is even is
considered. Adjacent µ values in (A.3) are paired
µ1 ≺µ2︸ ︷︷ ︸≺ µ3 ≺ µ4︸ ︷︷ ︸≺ · · · ≺ µKt−1 ≺ µKt︸ ︷︷ ︸(A.4)
and the corresponding g∗ parameters are obtained using the formulas p∗kg∗ =
p2k−1+p2k
2 ,
µ∗kg∗ =
p2k−1µ2k−1 + p2kµ2k
p2k−1 + p2k
and
(A.5)
σ∗kg∗ =
p2k−1σ2k−1 + p2kσ2k
p2k−1 + p2k
for k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg∗ . To obtain W
∗ and Z∗, objects with Wi = g1 or Wi = g2
are relabeled as W ∗i = g
∗. For these objects, the allocation to the Kg∗ com-
ponents is carried out using a Bayes allocation scheme. Explicit expressions
for the allocation probabilities are provided in Dass and Li (2008). When Kt
is odd, an index, i0 is selected at random from the set of all odd integers up
to Kt, namely, {1,3,5, . . . ,Kt}. The triplet (pi0 ,µi0 ,σi0) is not merged with
any other indices but the new p∗i0 = pi0/2. The remaining adjacent indices
are merged according to Step 3.
A.2. The G-split move. The split move is reverse to the merge step
above and is carried out in the following steps:
Step 1: A candidate G-component for split, say, g, is chosen randomly
with probability 1/G. The split components are denoted by g1 and g2. The
first level mixing probability, ωg, is split into ωg1 and ωg2 by generating
a uniform random variable, u0, in [0,1] and setting ωg1 = u0ωg and ωg2 =
(1− u0)ωg.
Step 2: The value of Kg is transformed to Kt where Kt is either 2Kg − 1
or 2Kg with probability 1/2 each. Once Kt is determined, a pair of indices
(Kg1 ,Kg2) is selected randomly from the set of all possible pairs of integers
in {Kmin,Kmin+1, . . . ,Kmax}
2 satisfying Kg1 +Kg2 =Kt. If M0 is the total
number of such pairs, then the probability of selecting one such pair is
1/M0. The selection of Kg1 and Kg2 determines the number of second level
components in the g1 and g2 groups.
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Step 3: The aim now is to split each component of the triplet (pg,µg,σg)
into 2 parts: (pg1 ,µg1 ,σg1) and (pg2 ,µg2 ,σg2) such that both µg1 and µg2
satisfy the constraints (A.1) for g = g1 and g2. The case of Kg1 + Kg2 =
2Kg is first considered. A sketch of the split move is best described by the
diagram in Figure 6, which introduces the additional variables to be used
for performing the split. In Figure 6, 2pg is considered for splitting because
the two split components will represent the second level mixing probabilities
of g1 and g2, the sum of which together equals 2.
For each k, the variable ukg in Figure 6 takes three values, namely, 0, 1
and 2 that respectively determines if the split components of 2pkg, µkg and
σkg either (1) both go to component g2, (2) one goes to component g1 and
the other goes to g2, or (3) both go to g1. The variables ukg, k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg
must satisfy several constraints: (1)
∑Kg
k=1 ukg =Kg1 , (2) ukg = 1 for any k
such that pkg > 0.5, and (3)
∑
k : ukg=h
2pkg < 1 for h = 0,2. The reader is
referred to our technical report Dass and Li (2008) for further explanation
of these restrictions.
To generate the vector u≡ (u1g, u2g, . . . , uKgg)
′, we consider all combina-
tions of u ∈ {0,1,2}Kg , and reject the ones that do not satisfy the three
restrictions. From the total number of remaining admissible combinations,
M1, say, we select a vector u randomly with equal probability 1/M1.
Once u has been generated, a random vector v ≡ (vkg, k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg)
is generated to split 2pg (see Figure 6). Some notation are in order: Let
A0 = {k :ukg = 0}, A1 = {k :ukg = 1} and A2 = {k :ukg = 2}. As in the case
of u, a few restrictions also need to be placed on the vector v. To see what
Fig. 6. Splits of 2pg, µg and σg. The partial ordering ≺ is the ordering on µ
(1)
kg s. The
right arrows “→” represents the sequential split for µg and σg.
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these restrictions are, we denote
p
(1)
kg = 2vkgpkg and p
(2)
kg = 2(1− vkg)pkg(A.6)
for k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg, to be the split components from 2pkg. Note that depend-
ing on the value of ukg = 0,1 or 2, the split components, p
(1)
kg and p
(2)
kg , are
either both assigned to component g2, one to g1 and the other to g2, or both
to g1. For the case ukg = 1, we will assume that p
(1)
kg is the split probability
that goes to g1 and p
(2)
kg goes to g2. Note that the mixing probabilities for
both components g1 and g2 should equal 1. This implies∑
k : k∈A1
p
(1)
kg +
∑
k : k∈A2
2pkg = 1 and
∑
k : k∈A1
p
(2)
kg +
∑
k : k∈A0
2pkg = 1(A.7)
for components g1 and g2, respectively. The second equation of (A.7) is
redundant if the first is assumed since
∑
k : k∈A1
p
(1)
kg +
∑
k : k∈A2
2pkg +∑
k : k∈A1
p
(2)
kg +
∑
k : k∈A0
2pkg = 2
∑Kg
k=1 pkg = 2. We rewrite the first equa-
tion as ∑
k : k∈A1
akvkg = 1,(A.8)
where ak = 2pkg/(1−
∑
k : k∈A2
2pkg). Equation (A.8) implies that the entries
of the vector v are required to satisfy two restrictions: (1) 0 ≤ vkg ≤ 1 for
k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg from (A.6), and (2) equation (A.8) above. In Dass and Li
(2008), an algorithm is given to generate such a v where the proposal density
can be written down in closed form.
The split of µg and σg is carried out by generating two new random
vectors ykg and zkg, for k = 1,2, . . . ,Kg; see Figure 6. The generation of
ykg is subject to restrictions arising from constraint (A.1) on µg. The other
component of the split of µg and σg, y˜kg and z˜kg, are obtained by solving two
(vectorized) linear equations [see Dass and Li (2008)]. Our techical report
also gives further details of the RJMCMC sampler, including obtaining the
new first and second level labels as well as the deriving explicit expressions
for the allocation probabilities and the Jacobian of the transformation from
(θ,u) to θ∗.
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